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Abstract Frequent and open interaction between venture
capitalists (VCs) and entrepreneurs is necessary for venture
capital investments to occur. Increasingly, these invest-
ments are made across jurisdictions. The vast majority of
these cross-border investments are carried out in a syndi-
cate of two or more VCs, indicating the effects of intra-
industry networks needing further analysis. Using China as
a model, we provide a novel multidimensional framework
to explain cross-border investments in innovative ventures
across developed and emerging economies. By analyzing a
unique international dataset, we examine worldwide ven-
ture capital investment flows from 2000–2012 and consider
the effects of geographical, cultural, and institutional
proximity as well as institutional and relational trust. We
find trust to mitigate the negative effects of geographical
and cultural distance, where institutional trust is more
relevant for investments in emerging economies, and
relational trust is more relevant for investments in devel-
oped economies.
Keywords Venture capital  Institutional trust 
Relational trust  Corruption  China  Syndication 
Emerging economies
JEL Classification G3  K4  D81
Introduction
Venture capitalists (VCs) are specialized financial inter-
mediaries who combine their unique blend of technological
competence and financial skills, to provide both financial
and managerial support for entrepreneurs in innovative
ventures. It has been established by extant research that
VCs not only promote innovative activities (Kortum and
Lerner 2000; Samila and Sorenson 2010, 2011), but they
also provide additional value-added support to enable
innovative products or services to be rapidly brought to
market (Black and Gilson 1998; Bygrave and Timmons
1992). It is not surprising, therefore, that the creation of
flourishing venture capital markets has become an integral
goal of recent innovation-related public policies in many
developed and emerging economies (Beck et al. 2008;
Cumming 2006a; Kortum and Lerner 2000). Although
some initiatives have reached their goals, many such
policies have not been found to be successful (Cumming
2003, 2006b, 2007a, b, 2011). While research has deter-
mined varied reasons for such failures, we believe that one
of the main reasons for the lack of success in encouraging
venture capital investment is local bias. Local bias has long
been considered inherent in financial intermediary activity,
as financial intermediaries feel a strong need for spatial
proximity and rely heavily on local expertise (Coval and
Moskowitz 1999, 2001; French and Poterba 1991; Parwada
2008) to mitigate agency problems. Local bias is, thus, a
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significant hurdle to breach as markets seek to accelerate
development by tapping foreign sources of knowledge and
capital (Avnimelech et al. 2006). Local bias can be even
more significant for venture capital, as investment in
innovative activities involves considerable uncertainty and
is characterized by asymmetric information at the outset
and agency problems during the investment process. Fre-
quent and open interaction between investor and investee
within close proximity appears necessary for these invest-
ments to succeed (Cumming and Dai 2010; Engel and
Keilbach 2007; Sapienza 1992; Sapienza et al. 1996).
A new, growing body of literature, however, suggests a
paradigm shift toward a more globally distributed venture
capital investment pattern (Baygan and Freudenberg 2000;
Guler and Guillén 2010; Kendall and Aizenman 2012;
Wright et al. 2005). This paradigm shift is not only of interest
to governments seeking to further develop local venture
capitalmarkets by attracting both foreign funds and expertise,
but researchers also have an interest in deciphering this
changing paradigm (Bruton et al. 2004, 2005; Avnimelech
et al. 2006; Groh et al. 2007, 2010), as this suggests well-
recognized institutional challenges that seem to have been
surmounted for cross-border investments—such as under-
developed investor and property protection (Peng 2001), high
cultural distance, diverging business ethics and practices
(Ahlstrom and Bruton 2006; Dai and Nahata 2013), and the
perception of corruption in certain jurisdictions (Johan and
Naja 2010). One possible explanation catching the attention
of researchers is network effects, specifically the growing
tendency for foreign VCs to team up in a syndicate with
domestic partners to take advantage of their local expertise
and to ensure interaction (Lerner 1994; Mowery et al. 1996;
Dai and Nahata 2013; Manigart et al. 2002, 2006; Nahata
et al. 2013; Sorenson and Stuart 2008). In this paper, we
analyze these network effects and their effect on local bias.
An example of a jurisdiction that has benefited from this
paradigm shift is China. China’s institutional environment
encompasses the abovementioned weaknesses and has at
times been called ‘‘peculiar’’ (Bruton and Ahlstrom 2003;
Wang et al. 2013; Lu et al. 2012; Tan and Tan 2005). In
addition, with regard to institutional trust, which we take to
indicate overall trust in the institutional structure and the
honest behavior of citizens in a particular country, China
ranks particularly low. However, China has been able to
not only build a venture capital market from scratch since
1984 (Xiao 2002) but also has been able to develop it to the
success it possesses today. China’s success at attracting
both local and foreign venture capital has been previously
attributed to network-based strategies, also known as a
form of relational trust, or guanxi, utilized by market par-
ticipants (Peng 2003; Pukthuanthong and Walker 2007; Su
et al. 2007). In this paper, we posit that while institutional
trust is not attached to a particular relationship, it serves to
ease the way in establishing one, as it mitigates the effects
of lack of proximity in cross-border investments. As the
relationship is established and relational trust is built, the
perceived uncertainty of the investments gradually decli-
nes, while a mutual understanding develops, and both
parties move toward a more symmetric information base.
Thus, even in the absence of relational trust, we expect
countries with high institutional trust to hold higher venture
capital inflows and syndication activities, despite potential
social and geographical distance. We refer to China as a
model for this paper, as we seek to augment existing
research in the pattern of international alliances and syn-
dicates in the venture capital industry. We believe that for a
more thorough understanding of the balance between
institutional factors and network effects, our research must
take into account numerous jurisdictions, both developed
and emerging, for legal, lingual, political, and market
capitalization and cultural differences to be appropriately
analyzed. More importantly, few jurisdictions possess such
pronounced institutional characteristics as China.
We begin by acknowledging that although geographical
and cultural normsmay differ across countries, one thing that
remains unchanged is the secretive and high-risk nature of
nascent, innovative start-up firms. To mitigate the adverse
selection risk in start-up investment, frequent, persistent, and
open exchange of both codified and tacit information
(Polanyi 1966) is necessary between the creators of the
innovation and their cross-border financiers (Gompers and
Lerner 1999; Cumming 2006a). The frequency, openness,
and quality of the social exchange among parties is naturally
dependent upon proximity. For the purposes of this paper, we
use several measures to analyze the effect of geographic,
institutional, lingual, and cultural proximity, along with
corruption levels and political instability.
Along this process of exchanging both codified and tacit
information among market participants, institutional trust
must be established; as the number of interactions increase,
relational trust also increases. We recognize that institu-
tional and relational trust differ in their influence,
depending on the participant composition of the invest-
ments (foreign only vs. foreign and domestic VCs) and the
institutional setup of the destination country (developed vs.
emerging economy).
We find that the higher the geographical and cultural
distance, the lower the likelihood of cross-border invest-
ment. High market capitalization and low corruption levels
in the destination country encourage VCs to overcome
local bias and consider an investment in that country.
When focusing on investments in emerging economies, we
also find a particularly strong negative effect on corruption.
Venture capital flow does appear to move from high-
growth countries to low-growth countries; therefore, it
appears that VCs are willing to take on the higher risk of
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investment in emerging economies. Our findings suggest
that VCs mitigate the investment risk with social exchange
among a syndicate comprising at least one local VC to
overcome lack of proximity. Our findings also suggest that
relational trust helps overcome high geographical, cultural,
and institutional distance. We find, however, that institu-
tional trust has a more positive impact on cross-border
venture capital flows from developed to emerging econo-
mies. This may be because VCs may prefer to rely on their
familiarity with established institutional factors in making
investment decisions and do not necessarily view relational
trust as a substitute for institutional trust. Sophisticated
VCs with sectoral experience, for example, may believe
they are sufficiently capable to assess the viability of an
innovative firm. The VCs’ sectoral experience along with
the institutional experience they have gathered ex-ante
allow such VCs to not be reliant on the information gath-
ered from social exchange with less sophisticated local
VCs ex-post, though such information may still mitigate
investment risk. Another explanation for institutional trust
having more of an impact on cross-border venture capital
flow from developed to emerging markets is that VCs from
the developed economies would prefer not to dilute their
reputational capital by investing with less reputable VCs
from emerging economies. (See a related study linking VC
reputation in China with performance, Wang et al. 2013).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In
‘‘Theory and Hypotheses’’ section, we provide a theoretical
background, review seminal academic work, and develop a
socio-economic framework of cross-border venture capital.
Empirical tests are discussed in ‘‘Empirical Setting’’ sec-
tion. ‘‘Results andDiscussion’’ section concludes and derives
implications for practitioners, policy makers, and scholars.
Theory and Hypotheses
Prior research has sought to explain the patterns of global
venture capital allocation with reference to general macroe-
conomic conditions. Most of the research concludes that
certain characteristics, such as high market capitalization
(Black and Gilson 1998), growth rates (Romain and Van
Pottelsberghe 2004a, b), and sophisticated institutions which
ensure the protection of investors rights (Guler and Guillén
2005, 2010; La Porta et al. 1997, 1998, 2000), create favor-
able investment conditions that ultimately lead to higher
cross-border venture capital. While such determinants that
capture different aspects of a country’s aggregated economic
activity can somehow trigger cross-border venture capital
flows, we believe they are somewhat limited in explanatory
power. In particular, they fail to acknowledge the inherent
features of innovation, which makes its finance distinctively
challenging (Hall 2010; Hall and Lerner 2009). Innovation,
by definition, is the creation of somewhat qualitatively dif-
ferent, novel, and unproven products, processes, or business
models. The financing of innovation is surrounded by
uncertainty, stemming mainly from incomplete information
and a limited ability to interpret incomplete information
(Knight 1921). Such incomplete information leads to high
adverse selection risks borne by the financier of innovation.
Furthermore, the entrepreneurs or innovators usually have
more complete information than the venture capital investors
(Cumming 2006a). In the case of start-ups, this problem is
further amplified as historical data enabling the projection of
future performance are neither available for the applied
technology nor the firm (Berger and Frame 2007; Berger and
Udell 1998; Berger and Udell 2002; Freel 1999, 2000, 2007).
Unlike other forms of traditional financing, such as bank or
public market financing, the quality of both quantitative and
qualitative information necessary to evaluate the financing of
an innovative start-up firm is so poor that VCs have to resort
to spatial proximity and local expertise or knowledge to
gather the information required to mitigate their significant
financial risk (Coval andMoskowitz 1999, 2001; French and
Poterba 1991). This information gathering may be signifi-
cantly more challenging in cross-border investments, espe-
cially between developed and emerging economies;
therefore, local bias is inevitable.
Polanyi (1966) classifies human knowledge as consist-
ing of codified (or explicit) and tacit elements, where
codified elements are easily transmittable using a stan-
dardized formal and systematic language, such as mathe-
matics, and tacit elements are context dependent and
personal, hard to formalize and transmit over distance,
necessitating face-to-face and interpersonal interaction
(Arrow 1962; Von Hippel 1994). Information required to
mitigate traditional financial risk and ascertain return
optimization, such as balance sheets or performance
records, is of a codified nature and readily available. We
noted earlier that for venture start-ups, such information is
rarely available. Even where such information is available
and codified, with cross-border investments, the informa-
tion may not necessarily be easily decipherable, not com-
pletely understood, as though in a different language or
subject to an unfamiliar institutional context. In addition,
tacit knowledge includes the personal characteristics of an
entrepreneur or an understanding of novel product con-
cepts; tacit knowledge is not readily available and gradu-
ally unfolds in a timely process of interaction between
individuals. Hence, the very act of gathering tacit infor-
mation requires the establishment of a relationship and
continuous interaction between (co-) investors and
entrepreneurs.
As a consequence, we suggest concepts usually used to
explain the emergence and performance of interpersonal
and organizational relationships to be of high explanatory
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power when analyzing cross-border VC investments. In
particular, we draw from proximity concepts (Boschma and
Frenken 2010; Boschma 2005) and theories on institutional
and relational trust.
We know that spatial proximity and local expertise or
knowledge is used by VCs to identify the existence of
innovative ventures and to gather the information required
to mitigate their significant financial risk (Coval and
Moskowitz 1999, 2001; French and Poterba 1991). We
believe that geographical proximity, which indicates the
physical distance between the VC and the innovative start-
up firm, is necessary for frequent and open interaction
between the VC and the entrepreneur (Cumming and Johan
2007). Open interaction facilitates the gathering of both
codified and tacit information required by VCs to deter-
mine the existence of innovative ideas and the viability of
an investment in an innovative venture. We know that
geographic proximity is especially important in the pre-
deal selection, due-diligence, as well as the post-deal
monitoring and value-adding phase of a venture investment
(Cumming and Dai 2010; Davila et al. 2003; Engel and
Keilbach 2007; Jääskeläinen et al. 2006; Kanniainen and
Keuschnigg 2003, 2004; Mäkelä and Maula 2008;
Sapienza 1992; Sapienza et al. 1996). This is mainly
because the advice and monitoring provided to the start-up
firm is made at board or management meetings at the firm
office; therefore, geographic proximity allows VCs to
easily travel to the firm office within the VC’s constrained
time limitations (Cumming and Johan 2006b, 2007). Note
that a VC would have more than one investee firm in his
portfolio; traveling between large geographic distances
would therefore affect the frequency of interaction between
the entrepreneur and the VC.
In addition to geographic proximity, institutional simi-
larities and differences in legal systems are also likely to
influence cross-border VC investment activity. Venture
capitalists do their best to mitigate the agency costs of
venture investment (Avnimelech et al. 2006; Fiet 1995a, b;
Shepherd and Zacharakis 2001) with the use of effective
contracts and governance structures (Cumming and Johan
2013). The differences in legal systems increase informa-
tion asymmetries, the cost (legal and contractual), and the
risk of investment. Seminal work by La Porta et al. (1998,
2000) has shown that law quality can significantly affect
the costs and benefits associated with monitoring the
entrepreneur. Briefly stated, more efficient legal systems
lower the costs associated with monitoring the entrepreneur
and, thereby, increase the scope for the VC to maximize
private benefits or profits. More dissimilar and inefficient
legal systems are known to impede the ability of a VC to
finance firms and, thus, hamper the rate of investment. In
addition to legality differences, other institutional factors—
including levels of corruption and political instability—
will also affect investment (Johan et al. 2013; Johan and
Najar 2010; Davis and Ruhe 2003). Furthermore, sharing a
common language may be a necessary precondition for
knowledge transfer. We take into consideration lingual
distance, as we believe that codified elements of informa-
tion are worthless if indecipherable due to lingual distance.
Cultural dimension is also of high importance when
explaining how business is accomplished in general (Hof-
stede and Bond 1984). Cultural distance, another proximity
measure, can be associated with diverging values, business
ethics, and codes of conduct. As recent studies show,
countries with higher cultural distance show higher mis-
trust (Guiso et al. 2008), and discourage risk sharing
(Giannetti and Yafeh 2012) among potential investors.
Since the selection, evaluation, monitoring, and manage-
ment support of VC investments necessarily requires fre-
quent and open interactions between involved participants,
high cultural distance can be expected to represent a major
obstacle for cross-border investments. Tacit elements of
information gathering are context dependent, and cultural
distance may make this significantly more difficult among
parties.
To overcome the limitations of proximity, VCs seek to
cross borders when investing in innovative ventures do so
within syndicates. Some choose to syndicate with local
VCs, as cross-border syndicates between domestic and
foreign investors are said to reduce transaction costs
(Tykvová and Schertler 2008) and bridge high cultural and
institutional distance (Dai and Nahata 2013; Tykvová and
Schertler 2010).
We, therefore, hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 1
1. Geographical, cultural, and institutional distance neg-
atively affects venture capital investment activity
between countries.
2. The negative effects of geographical, cultural, and
institutional distance are less pronounced in cross-
border investments syndicated with a domestic VC.
We noted in an earlier section that VCs do their best to
mitigate the agency costs of venture investment with the use
of effective contracts and governance structures to protect
themselves against opportunistic behavior (Fiet 1995a, b;
Shepherd and Zacharakis 2001; Avnimelech et al. 2006;
Cumming and Johan 2013). Such risks, however, can never
be completely eliminated (Farmer andWinter 1986; Sahlman
1990; Bergemann and Hege 1998; Cumming and Johan
2013). It is especially difficult to mitigate such agency costs
with the use of contracts and governance structures in view of
less efficient laws and corporate structures across different
borders (Cumming and Johan 2006a; La Porta et al. 1997,
1998, 2000). In situations where residual uncertainty
746 D. Hain et al.
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stemming from incomplete contracts and asymmetric infor-
mation cannot be eliminated through contracts and protection
through formal institutions, trust among parties is imperative
in facilitating investment activities, which is particularly true
when it comes to investment in innovation (Nooteboom
2006). For the purposes of this paper, we distinguish between
institutional and relational trust (Rousseau et al. 1998).
Institutional trust is present ex-ante to the interaction and
refers to the trust in the institutional environment, which
includes institutional factors related to the legal framework
and its enforceability as well as soft factors, such as a soci-
ety’s attitude to behave fairly and honestly. In contrast,
relational trust ex-post unfolds gradually through repeated
interactions over time (McAllister 1995; Blau 1964).
Weargue that institutional and relational trust are both very
important in cross-border venture capital deals, but they differ
in their influence, depending on the participant composition
(foreign only vs. foreign and domestic VCs) of the invest-
ments and the institutional setup of the destination country
(developed vs. emerging economy). Our arguments are based
on prior research, which finds that in high-trust societies,
parties must spend fewer resources to protect themselves
against opportunistic behavior. Partiesmaking investment and
production decisions more focused on the long run have
higher incentives and return on the accumulation of human
capital (Knack and Keefer 1997) and are more likely to share
knowledge (Dovey 2009) and participate in open innovation
projects (Nooteboom 2006). Trust between countries also
positively influences their economic exchange in terms of
stock market investments (Guiso et al. 2008), foreign direct
investments, and bilateral trade (Guiso et al. 2009).
Recently Duffner et al. (2009) and Bottazzi et al. (2011)
also provide empirical evidence showing a strong statistical
and economic significance of trust on venture capital
investments, reporting generalized and personalized trust
ex-ante to reduce doubts regarding an investment decision
and ex-post to provide a good foundation for efficient and
effective communication and interaction between them.
For stand-alone foreign investments, we assume that the
VC and the entrepreneur maintain no relationship prior to
the investment; thus, they have no way to build up
endogenous forms of trust. Here, the role of institutional
trust ex-ante is of significant importance, providing the
foundation for building up a critical mass of initial trust to
enter a relationship involving proximity. Once the rela-
tionship is initiated, the parties build up relational trust,
resulting from frequent and open information sharing. We
note, however, that relational trust ex-post unfolds gradu-
ally through repeated interactions over time, and the extent
of proximity will affect the absorption rate of social
exchange; therefore, for investments with greater distance
between developed and emerging economies, for example,
institutional trust would play a greater role at the outset.
The relationship between the entrepreneur and a VC
would differ from one VC to another. The VC community
is small, and reputation is key (Hsu 2004; Nahata 2008;
Nahata et al. 2013). Information regarding unprofessional
or dishonest behavior diffuses quickly and influences a
VC’s future deal flow opportunity substantially in quantity
and quality. As a consequence, VCs theoretically have an
incentive to consistently behave honestly and fairly with
their investees and syndicates in order to maintain or build
up their valuable reputation. However, for cross-border
relationships, proximity may temper the dissemination of
reputational quality. Also, the quality of VCs from
emerging economies may not be up to par in relation to
VCs from more developed jurisdictions (Nahata et al.
2013). However, VCs working as a syndicate or a network
are able to build up, over time, persistent long-term rela-
tionships. As a result, relational trust eventually emerges
between former syndication partners, lowering the uncer-
tainty when joining further investment invitations with the
same partners. Still, we expect this effect due to differences
in reputation effects and experience/quality to be of lower
magnitude for foreign-domestic syndicates in emerging
economies. Thus, we hypothesize as follows:
Hypothesis 2
1. Institutional and relational trust positively affects
bilateral venture capital investment activity and dimin-
ishes the negative effects of geographical, social, and
institutional distance.
2. The positive effects of institutional trust appear
stronger for investments in emerging compared with
developed economies.
3. The positive effects of institutional trust appear weaker
for cross-border investments syndicated with domestic
VCs.
4. The positive effects of relational trust appear weaker
for investments in emerging compared with developed
economies.
Empirical Setting
Data and Variables
In the following section,we briefly describe our data sources,
empiricalmodel, employed variables, and their construction.
For our empirical analyses, we draw from Bureau van Dijk’s
Zephyr databases on global equity investments.1We include
all venture capital identified deals between 1998 and 2012,
1 For a detailed description of the Zephyr database and its positive
value for cross-border venture capital research, see Schertler and
Tyvova (2009, 2010); Tykvova and Schertler (2010).
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where the first two years are only used to create lagged
variables of investment activities. To minimize noise caused
by one-off investments, we exclude investments of VCs that
carried out only five or less investments during the final
observation period, 2000–2012.We aggregate these deals on
the level of the dyad between source and destination country.
In deals with investors from multiple source countries, the
deal is accounted once for every involved country dyad,
independent of the number of investors. For example, if two
French VCs and one German VC invest in syndicate in an
Irish portfolio firm, the country dyads FR-IE andDE-IE both
get one additional count for this deal. Our final dataset
contains 30,650 deals, of which 11,665 cross-national bor-
ders; 1555 VCs in 8.665 unique portfolio companies located
in 37 countries—22 developed and 15 emerging econo-
mies—carry out these cross-border deals. Table 1 sets out a
matrix of venture capital investments between country pairs,
where we show the activity between the top quantile of
countries in terms of VC activity. Table 2 provides further
information on domestic venture capital investments, cross-
border inflows, and outflows per country.
Dependent Variables
In most related studies, venture capital flows between
country dyads and is measured by either counting the
number of investments or their monetary value, which is
strongly influenced by the size of the countries under study.
All else being equal, this amount is obviously expected to
be higher between large economies, and vice versa. To take
the gravity effect of economic size into account (e.g.,
Feenstra et al. 2005; Krugman 1980; Pöyhönen 1963;
Tinbergen 1962), we construct our dependent variable as a
measure of venture capital flow propensity.
VCproptti!j ¼
VCFlowti!j=VCinvest
t
i
GDPti=GDP
t
j
: ð1Þ
The numerator represents the share of dyadic invest-
ments from the source country for all the venture capital
investments in the destination country; the denominator
represents the ratio between the source and destination
country’s GDP.
For the sake of comparison and robustness, we also used
the number of annual deal counts ðVCinvti!jÞ as a depen-
dent variable for an alternative model.
Independent Variables
Geographical Distance
We follow Mayer and Zignago (2011) by measuring geo-
graphical distance as the population density adjusted for
distance in kilometers between a country dyad (CEPII
Database), where we generally expect a negative effect on
venture capital investment activity. However, with
increasing geographical distance, investors are able to
substitute means of transportation (e.g., car, train, airplane)
and communication, leading to a non-linear increase of
investment obstacles in geographical space (Sorenson and
Stuart 2001). To account for this, we use the logarithmic
transformation of geographical distance.
Cultural Distance
To measure cultural distance, we calculate the distance
between countries over Hofstede’s et al. (2010) four cul-
tural dimensions (power distance, individualism, mas-
culinity, uncertainty avoidance), following the approach of
Kogut and Singh (1988), as in Eq. 2
dist cultij ¼
P4
u¼1
Iuj Iui
varðIuÞ
4
: ð2Þ
Lingual Distance
In addition, we include a dummy variable provided by
Melitz and Toubal (2012) indicating that the countries
share a common language (same langij) spoken by at least
10 % of the population in both countries. The lack of a
common language might very well represent an obstacle in
both the communication of both codified and tacit infor-
mation between VCs and investee firms and between
entrepreneurs and other officials in the destination country.
Institutional Distance and Quality of Institutions
Venture capitalists investing in countries with different
institutional settings are confronted with unfamiliar explicit
and implicit ‘‘rules of the game’’ (North 1990), codes of
conduct, and general business practices and ethics. Institu-
tional distance is, thus, commonly regarded as a major
obstacle for cross-border venture capital investments (Guler
andGuillén 2010;Megginson 2004). To analyze the effect of
institutional distance, we employ a set of different measures.
First, a dummy variable is implemented indicating the
country’s legal system, based on different law traditions
(same legali,j), as classified by La Porta et al. (1998). Legal
differences are associated with increased ex-ante informa-
tion costs and decreased ex-post capabilities of adding
value and are, thus, expected to negatively affect invest-
ment activities between country dyads. The level of cor-
ruption in the destination country represents another
institutional facet likely to affect cross-border venture
capital flows, particularly in developing economies which
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tend to have less-developed, formal institutional structures
(Peng 2000). We, therefore, include the Corruption Per-
ception Index (cpitj) provided by Transparency Interna-
tional in our set of independent variables. The CPI reflects
the view of a panel of country experts on how corrupt the
public sector of the corresponding country is perceived.
The CPI is considered one of the most reliable measures of
corruption around the world (Wilhelm 2002). Generally,
we expect corruption to negatively affect the amount of
cross-border venture capital inflows. However, in countries
with rigid and ineffective formal institutions, market-dri-
ven corruption can also be a means to grease the wheel and
get business done (Huntington and Fukuyama, 2006;
Nielsen 2003; Leff 1964; Levy 2007). Learning to deal
with corruption might turn out to be a key capability in
such settings. Therefore, we also include the differential
between the destination and source country’s CPI (Dcpitji)
in our empirical tests. To account for the effects of political
instability and the associated increase of uncertainty in
countries with highly unstable political regimes, we also
employ the measure provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010),
which captures perceptions of the likelihood that the gov-
ernment will be destabilized or overthrown by unconsti-
tutional or violent means (inst stabtj).
Institutional Trust
Institutional trust is the perception that other people can
generally be considered as trustworthy. Institutional trust
represents a commonly used measurement for social capital
and relational embeddedness, and it is said to strongly
impact economic activity in (e.g., Dovey 2009; Guiso et al.
2008; Knack and Keefer 1997), as well as between,
countries (Guiso et al. 2009), particularly in transactions
characterized by high uncertainty (Nooteboom 2006). To
analyze the impact of this institutional facet on cross-bor-
der venture capital flows, we employ a common measure
for institutional trust (trustj) in economic analysis (e.g.,
Beugelsdijk 2006; Knack and Keefer 1997) provided by the
Survey (2009).2 We expect high-trust destination countries
to receive a higher share of cross-border venture capital
investments. Comparing the WWS in-country measure
with the measure of bilateral trust provided by the Euro-
barometer (2011)3 reveals a high correlation between a
country’s internal generalized trust and the trust received
by other countries. Therefore, we also interpret a country’s
generalized trust as an approximation for the level of trust
received by the source country. Trust in the society as a
whole is also cause and consequence of trust in the quality
of political and economic institutions. Hence, it is not
surprising that the WWS measure of generalized trust, in
our sample as well as other studies, strongly correlates with
measures of institutional quality, such as indices for
political stability, property right protection, freedom of
press and speech, and quality of the legal system.
Relational Trust
In order to analyze the possible effect on syndication that
domestic venture capitalists might play in bridging geo-
graphical, institutional, and cultural distance (Dai and
Nahata 2013; Tykvová and Schertler 2010), harnessing
synergies of complementary resource bases (Chemmanur
et al. 2011), and providing credible signals on the portfolio
companies’ quality (Mäkelä and Maula 2008), we also
include a variable (VC syndti!j) representing the share of
Table 2 VC investments by country
AT BE CH DE DK ES FI FR GB GR IE IT JP NL NO PT SE US
Domestic investments
Volume 400 669 748 6,014 799 1420 697 0 11,823 15 582 690 352 1205 292 43 1498 126,961
Number 80 155 136 1145 166 309.0 167 0 2433 4 201 86 151 224 57 12 362 11,794
Gross cross-border inflow (from all sample countries)
Volume 105 363 647 1444 344 232 241 0 3,593 0 356 226 18 625 166 16 556 10,020
Number 26 98 175 427 105 47 81 0 763 0 137 34 14 117 33 8 182 2402
Gross cross-border outflow (to all sample countries)
Volume 22 576 1905 2198 465 104 170 1,270 4,878 0 151 143 1616 870 229 12 538 3801
Number 9 185 487 552 138 26 62 367 1152 0 51 54 367 286 91 6 163 653
This table reports the aggregated venture capital investments, in- and outflows in the period between 2000 and 2013 on the country level,
measured in million EURO and, alternatively, in the number of investments
2 Since the different waves of the survey do not always cover all
countries, in some cases, survey results were used from older waves
between 1995 and 2000. The correlation coefficient across the
different waves always sits above 90 %, which indicates that the
phenomenon of trust is somewhat persistent over time.
3 Unfortunately, this measure is only available for a subset of
European countries and, therefore, could not be used against the
background of our analysis.
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investments carried out in syndication with domestic
investors to all investments of the source i in the destination
country j. While cross-border investments of foreign VCs
directly into domestic investee companies may not neces-
sarily necessitate a former relationship between them, for
syndicated investments between domestic and foreign VCs,
it is verywell likely that not onlywill the participants already
know each other, either through prior joint investments,
shared contacts, or reputation, but that there sufficient, open,
and persistent lines of communication exist. Thus, for our
analysis, we interpret (VC syndti!j) as a first approximation
of potential relational trust between country dyads.
Trade Flow
To account for the intensity of economic relationships
between countries, we use a standard measure from the
trade literature: The product of last year’s export from
country i to j and j to i, divided by the products of their
GDP, as illustrated in Eq. 4:
tradet1i!j ¼
exportt1i!j  exportt1j!i
gdpti  gdpt1j
: ð4Þ
Control Variables
Furthermore, we control for the following country and
country dyad-specific characteristics. The growth-rate of
the destination country’s GDP (growtht1j ) reflects the
tendency to invest in countries with high economic growth
and the differential between the growth of destination and
source country. A vivid stock market represents a profitable
exit option for venture capital investment and is said to
have a positive effect on venture capital activity (Black and
Gilson 1998; Gompers et al. 2008), which we take into
account by incorporating control variables for the desti-
nation country’s ratio of market capitalization
(capitalisationt1j ) and stocks traded capitalization
(stockst1j ) to its GDP. Additional to the characteristics of
the destination country, we also include directional controls
for the differences between the destination and source
country (Dgrowtht1j , Dcapitalisation
t1
j , Dstocks
t1
j ). For
the sake of clarity, and to avoid very high differences in the
order of magnitude of the coefficients, we have rescaled all
control variables in the country dyad by dividing their
maximum, resulting in a range [0,1]. (Consider Table 6).
Foreign VC Characteristics
For an additional model analyzing the constellation of cross-
border venture capital deals, we also include a set of variables
indicating the highest prior investment experience of the
foreign VCs in the same sector (exp sectortmaxðkÞ), the desti-
nation country (exp countrytmaxðkÞ), and prior investments in
the current portfolio company itself (exp targettmaxðkÞ).
Descriptive Statistics
Table 3 provides the definitions of the main variables used
in our analyses; Tables 4 and 5 provide descriptive statis-
tics; and Tables 6 and 7 show a correlation matrix for the
set of variables on country dyad level and on deal level,
respectively.
The correlation matrix of our macro-level analysis
provided in Table 6 shows that, generally, venture capital,
in absolute ðVC countti!jÞ as well as in relative
(VC propti!j) terms, tends to flow toward destination
countries with low cultural and geographical distance and
low corruption and high trust, as one might expect. These
variables are also associated with a higher share of syndi-
cated investments between source and destination country
(VC syndti!j), contrary to the idea that VCs use syndication
with domestic partners particularly as a means of dealing
with high distance and local uncertainty. Interestingly,
there is no strong correlation observable between the
institutional, geographical, and technological distance per
se. The remaining correlations between variables are as
expected, overall, and in a reasonable scale. The only
exceptions are the high correlations between trusttj ,
inst: stabtj and cpi
t
j, and between capitalisation
t
j and stocks
t
j.
Since this set of variables measure different facets of the
same phenomenon, to some extent, high correlation can be
expected.4
Table 7 provides the correlation matrix for the set of
regressions at the deal level. Worth mentioning is that, in
contrast to the macro-level models, the variables for
institutional, cultural, and legal distance strongly correlate.
Again, by sequentially adding these variables in different
combinations in the model-building phase, we ensure the
stability of our models and the robustness of the results.
Model Specification
Even though the global venture capital investment network
has sharply increased during the last decade, compared
with international trade flows, which are still rather sparse,
only around a quarter of all country dyads show cross-
border venture capital investment activity during the
4 Since the models provide stable results, and colinearity diagnostic
statistics such as the variance inflation factor indicate no worrisome
instability, we decided to use these variables jointly. However, we
first ran a set of unreported regressions, in which we sequentially add
these variables in different combinations and observe changes in
coefficient values and variance.
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observation period. When explanations for these country
dyads without investment activity diverge from the model
estimating their absolute or relative amount of investment
activity, issues of structural zeroes and endogenous selec-
tion arise. To deal with potential biases, we apply two-
stage estimation techniques in both cases. For the set of
GLS regressions, we first fit a probit model, estimating the
probability that a country dyad accounts for any investment
activity from 1998 until 2012. Following Heckman (1979),
we calculate the inverse Mills ratio, and insert it into the
GLS model.5 Since many of our independent variables are
time-invariant and our dependent variable construction
makes it unlikely to face omitted variable problems (since
it already accounts for differences in domestic VC and
general economic activity), we deploy a random effect
model. Standard procedures such as the Hausman test
confirm this choice.
In another model, we are interested in contrasting entry-
mode decisions of VCs in foreign-developed and emerging
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics, country dyad level
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
VCti!j 70,571 0.151 1.943 0.000 104.000
VC propti!j 70,571 0.006 0.158 0.000 29.920
Distance
dist geoi,j 68,597 8.586 0.918 3.835 9.886
dist culti,j 36,414 0.060 0.023 0.006 0.150
same legali,j 70,571 0.225 0.418 0.000 1.000
same langi,j 68,597 0.146 0.353 0.000 1.000
Trust and relationship
trusti 63,711 0.063 0.314 -0.427 1.000
VC syndti!j 70,571 0.015 0.113 0.000 1.000
tradeti!j 31,819 0.002 0.023 0.000 1.000
Institutions
cpitj 66,226 0.559 0.227 0.150 1.000
inst: stabtj 68,605 0.260 0.921 -2.812 1.668
Controls
gdpt1j * 68,586 0.045 0.118 0.000 1.000
gdp capt1j * 68,587 0.178 0.180 0.002 1.000
gdp growtht1j * 68,516 0.893 0.103 0.000 1.000
capitalizationt1j * 66,570 0.110 0.115 0.000 1.000
stockst1j * 66,640 0.062 0.102 0.000 1.000
This table presents descriptive statistics of our main variables. Sub-
script i indicates the source country, j; the destination country; and k,
the VC firm
* Indicates that the variable is normalized (divided by maximum,
hence [0,1])
5 The results remain unreported yet are available on request.
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economies. In particular, we are interested in determining
which conditions local investors have included in the
otherwise foreign investment syndicate. Therefore, with
single cross-border venture capital deals as units of
observation, we run a simple logit model on the dependent
variable, which—if the deal includes not only the foreign
VC but also at least one investor with residence in the same
country as the investee firm—takes the value of one. To
contrast investments in developed economies with the ones
in emerging economies, we additionally run this model
using only the corresponding sub-sample. To avoid sam-
pling issues, we calculate the standard errors with the
bootstrapping method.
Results and Discussion
Table 8 reports the results of this set of GLS random effect
regressions again at the country dyad level where we are
aim to contrast the effects of distance and trust on VC
investment propensity in deals only consisting of foreign
investors vis-à-vis deals also including a domestic investor
located in the destination country. We therefore in models
1 and 2 only include foreign-only cross-border investments
when constructing our dependent variable (VC invti!j),
whereas in models 3 and 4, we only include foreign-do-
mestic syndicates.
At first glance, the results lend support to Hypothesis 1.1
and 1.2 indicating that VC investment activity is negatively
affected by geographical and cultural distance, where the
results are less pronounced in the sub-sample, including
investments only including a domestic syndication partner.
Both the magnitude and significance are lower in this sub-
sample. To allow for path dependencies in the VC
investment pattern, we control for the lagged dependent
variable (VC propt1i!j), which is significant in all settings.
tradet1i!j shows no statistical significance in all settings.
In Models 2 and 4, we introduce the measure for insti-
tutional trust in the destination country. As expected by
Hypothesis 2.1, institutional trust positively impacts cross-
border VC inflows. However, consistent with Hypothesis
2.3, institutional trust loses its significance when only
looking for deals syndicated domestic VCs.6
As discussed earlier, we expect the rationales of cross-
border venture capital investments to substantially differ
when targeting an emerging destination country. Therefore,
the next set of regressions, reported in Table 9, contrasts
dyadic VC flows with developed (Models 1–4) or emerging
destination countries (Models 5–8). The first striking
insight is that both samples differ substantially in terms of
coefficient magnitude, direction, significance, and overall
model fit. The results for the sub-sample of developed
destination countries show properties similar to the ones
reported in Table 8. Again, with a significant VC propt1i!j,
investment activities show path dependencies, and geo-
graphical as well as cultural distance has a negative impact
on cross-border VC investment activities, lending support
to Hypothesis 1.1. A negative and significant growtht1i!j
indicates venture capital to flow from countries with higher
growth to those with lower growth, which on first glance
appears counter-intuitive. In this sub-sample, the negative
effects of corruption on VC activity are particularly strong.
When we introduce our measure for relational trust
(VC syndti!j) in Model 2, representing the share of foreign-
domestic syndications in the whole cross-border invest-
ment activity, we observe a positive and significant effect.
While adding this variable leaves most other coefficients
and their corresponding p-values unchanged, it draws a
substantial part of the significance of geographical and
Table 5 Descriptive statistics deal level
Variable N Mean SD Min Max
Dependent variable
deal host 7349 0.599 0.490 0.000 1.000
Destination country
gdptj 7346 0.438 0.400 0.000 1.000
gdp growtht1j 7346 2.491 2.757 -14.072 14.781
capitalizationt1j 7344 107.068 46.252 -19.815 549.423
cpitj 7340 0.725 0.146 0.17 1.000
trusttj 7331 0.885 0.821 -1.478 3.459
Dyad
dist geomean(i,j) 7324 8.158 1.144 5.087 9.833
dist cultmean(i,j) 7251 0.040 0.024 0.006 0.130
legalmax(i,j) 7325 0.541 0.498 0.000 1.000
langmax(i,j) 7324 0.540 0.498 0.000 1.000
Acquiring foreign VCs
exp sectortmaxðkÞ 7349 21.607 38.652 1.000 270.000
exp countrytmaxðkÞ 7349 9.106 14.435 1.000 111.000
exp targettmaxðkÞ 7349 1.262 0.545 1.000 5.000
This table presents descriptive statistics of our main variables. Sub-
script i indicates the source country, j the destination country, and k
the VC firm
* Indicates that the variable is normalized (divided by maximum,
hence [0,1])
6 We additionally ran an unreported (but available on request) model
on the whole sample (foreign-only as well as foreign-domestic
investments), where we introduced an interaction term between trustj
and VC syndti!j, which turns out to be negative and significant on a
5 % level. We interpret this result as further evidence for the
suggested mitigating effect of teaming up with a local VC on
institutional trust.
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cultural distance, lending again support to Hypothesis 2.1.
When investing in developed economies, syndication with
domestic partners, which can be interpreted as a result of
relational trust, indeed seems to be common practice in
mitigating the effects of high geographical, cultural, and
institutional distance, a finding that supports Hypothesis
2.1. This also holds true when testing for the effect of
relational and institutional trust together in Model 4. Sur-
prisingly, institutional trust appears to have no significant
effect when only considering investments in developed
economies. In line with Hypothesis 2.2, our findings sug-
gest that institutional trust is ex-ante sufficiently estab-
lished for developed economies to estimate the viability of
investing in a developed jurisdiction.
For the sub-sample of emerging destination countries,
the picture changes substantially. The R2 drops to single-
digit values, and most coefficients completely lose their
significance. Neither geographical and cultural distance nor
commonly used macro variables such as GDP growth or
corruption in the destination country seem to have any
explanatory power at all, with destination country market
capitalization as the only exception. In Model 6, we also
introduce relational trust (VC syndti!j), which was highly
significant in the sub-sample of developed economies. As
expected in Hypothesis 2.4, in the context of emerging
economies, it again loses its explanatory power. Finally,
Model 7 includes the measure for institutional trust in the
destination country, which, in contrast to the developed
economies sub-sample, appears to have a positive coeffi-
cient significant at the one-percent level. When jointly
testing for the effects of institutional and relational trust in
Model 8, the results remain mostly unchanged. However,
in this model, we find a positive impact of institutional
stability, at least at the 10 % level.
Table 6 Correlation matrix country dyad level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) VC countti!j 1.0000
(2) VC propti!j 0.2412* 1.0000
(3) dist culti,j -0.0878* -0.0503* 1.0000
(4) dist geo i,j -0.0036 -0.0384* 0.1871* 1.0000
(5) dist tech i,j -0.0328* 0.0094 0.0493* 0.0374* 1.0000
(6) tradeti;j 0.0283* 0.0453* -0.0913* -0.1258* 0.0049 1.0000
(7) same legali,j 0.0612* 0.0417* -0.2471* -0.0806* 0.0064 0.0418* 1.0000
(8) same lang i,j 0.1058* 0.0485* -0.1593* 0.015 -0.0018 0.1569* 0.2385* 1.0000
(9) VC syndt
i!j
0.2059* 0.1641* -0.1005* -0.1581* -0.0613* 0.0477* 0.0574* 0.1452*
(10) trustj 0.0283* 0.0304* 0.1531* -0.0907* 0.0035 0.0115 -0.1168* 0.0008
(11) cpitj 0.0350* 0.0012 0.0824* -0.1505* 0.0003 -0.0073 -0.0697* 0.0742*
(12) gdp growthtj -0.0159 -0.0012 0.0165 0.1068* -0.001 0.0322* -0.0033 0.0234*
(13) capitalizationtj 0.0321* 0.0132 0.0308* 0.0456* -0.0059 0.0687* -0.0125 0.1422*
(14) stockstj 0.0882* 0.0581* 0.0377* 0.0219* -0.002 0.0599* -0.0102 0.1308*
(15) gdptj 0.2465* 0.1402* -0.0012 0.0761* 0.0076 0.0192* 0.0224* 0.0848*
(16) Inst stabtj 0.0013 -0.0132 0.0369* -0.1783* -0.0049 -0.0052 -0.0673* -0.0468*
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
(9) VC syndti!j 1.0000
(10) trustj 0.1084* 1.0000
(11) cpitj 0.1582* 0.6501* 1.0000
(12) gdp growthtj -0.0751* -0.0967* -0.2901* 1.0000
(13) capitalizationtj 0.0744* 0.2278* 0.4028* 0.1375* 1.0000
(14) stockstj 0.1714* 0.2981* 0.3481* 0.0237* 0.7248* 1.0000
(15) gdptj 0.3047* 0.1052* 0.0700* -0.0786* 0.0641* 0.3500* 1.0000
(16) Inst stabtj 0.0519* 0.5465* 0.7755* -0.2734* 0.2430* 0.1850* -0.0280* 1.0000
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients
* Indicates significant correlations at the 1 %-level
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These results indicate that the utilization of relational
trust via the syndication with domestic VCs helps to
overcome market entry barriers and transaction costs
associated with cross-border investments in a geographical,
cultural, or institutional distant country. This finding is, at
first glance, in line with recent research on cross-border VC
investments (e.g., Dai et al. 2012; Dai and Nahata 2013;
Tykvová and Schertler 2013), but also highlights that its
validity is restricted to practices in developed economies.
At least on the aggregated macro-level, no evidence for
such practices can be found when targeting emerging
economies. We find weak evidence for Hypothesis 2.2,
which suggests that institutional trust has an effect on
investments in emerging compared with developed
economies. Our results highlight the need to further ana-
lyze the drivers of venture capital investment in emerging
economies. It also suggests that at least a minimum level of
institutional trust seems to be a necessary condition to
attract foreign venture capital.
The results thus far suggest substantial qualitative dif-
ferences between stand-alone investments of foreign VCs
and the ones including local co-investors. We also find
cross-border investments in developed destination coun-
tries to be guided by quite different rationales than the ones
targeting emerging economies. Recent research (e.g., Dai
et al. 2012; Dai and Nahata 2013) suggests foreign VCs
underutilize the potential of joint investments with
domestic partners, which our results confirm. To further
investigate this issue, we raise the question, in an additional
model, how experience and other characteristics of the
foreign investors, within and between country, influences
the decision to include domestic partners. Thus, in
Table 10, we present the results of a logit model with
cross-border VC deals as unit of analysis. Our dichotomous
dependent variable takes the value of one where the cross-
border deal also includes a local VC. Hence, we not aim to
analyze the amount, but rather the composition of deals
targeting developed vis-à-vis emerging economies. We run
the models on the whole population (Models 1–2) as well
as the subpopulation only consisting of deals in developed
(Models 3–4) and emerging (Models 5–6) destination
countries. In the first set of models (Models 1, 3, and 5), we
test only for the effects of different forms of distance,
where we take the mean of all involved foreign VCs to
Table 7 Correlation matrix deal level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) deal host 1.0000
(2) gdptj 0.3144* 1.0000
(3) gdp captj 0.2667* 0.4751* 1.0000
(4) gdp growthtj -0.1386* -0.1139* -0.4336* 1.0000
(5) capitalizationtj 0.1715* 0.3327* 0.3288* 0.0980* 1.0000
(6) cpitj 0.2441* 0.0760* 0.6577* -0.4051* 0.3978* 1.0000
(7) trustj 0.0397* 0.1050* 0.2448* 0.1830* 0.1511* 0.2586* 1.0000
(8) dist geomean(i,j) -0.0002 0.4607* -0.0465* 0.1908* 0.1384* -0.3004* -0.0316* 1.0000
(9) dist cultmean(i,j) -0.1749* -0.1897* -0.3067* 0.1823* -0.1970* -0.3176* -0.0017 0.1571*
(1) legalmax(i,j) 0.0931* 0.0681* 0.1173* -0.0443* 0.1248* 0.1113* -0.0865* 0.0151
(11) langmax(i,j) 0.0699* 0.1082* 0.0995* -0.003 0.1715* 0.0494* -0.1603* 0.0991*
(12) exp sectortmaxðkÞ -0.0418* -0.1119* -0.1242* 0.0096 -0.0970* -0.0959* -0.0524* 0.0337*
(13) exp countrytmaxðkÞ 0.1768* 0.3096* 0.0886* -0.0612* 0.0459* -0.0093 -0.011 0.0913*
(14) exp targettmaxðkÞ 0.1577* 0.0512* 0.0838* -0.0509* 0.0302* 0.0618* -0.0036 -0.0514*
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
(9) dist geomean(i,j) 1.0000
(10) dist cultmean(i,j) -0.5308* 1.0000
(11) legalmax(i,j) -0.4955* 0.8125* 1.0000
(12) langmax(i,j) -0.0324* 0.0295 0.0550* 1.0000
(13) exp sectortmaxðkÞ -0.1990* 0.0792* 0.0849* 0.4169* 1.0000
(14) exp countrytmaxðkÞ -0.1093* 0.0747* 0.0722* 0.0942* 0.1871* 1.0000
This table presents Pearson correlation coefficients
* Indicates significant correlations at the 1 %-level
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construct our variables for geographical (dist geomean(i,j))
and cultural distance (dist cultmean(i,j)). For legal (same
legalmax(i,j)) and lingual similarity (same langmax(i,j)), we
maintain the dichotomous nature of the original variable,
and let them take the value of one in the event at least one
of the foreign VCs is located in a country with the same
language or legal system as the destination country. Since
our unit of analysis is now the cross-border VC deal, we are
able to also test for experience effects in the portfolio
company itself (exp targettmaxðkÞ), its’ sector
(exp sectortmaxðkÞ) and finally the destination country
(exp countrytmaxðkÞ) of the most experienced foreign VCs in
a second set of models (Models 2, 4, and 6).
The results for the whole sample (Models 1–2) again
indicate with a negative and significant coefficient for
emerging destination countries that VCs indeed appear to
be reluctant to create syndicates with partners from
emerging economies. In addition, the comparison between
developed (Models 3–4) and emerging (Models 5–6) des-
tination countries reveals some interesting differences.
While corruption (cpitj) negatively affects the tendency
for foreign VCs to syndicate with a local VC in developed
Table 8 Random effects GLS regression
Foreign only Foreign and domestic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Path dependency
VC syndt1i!j 0.300 (0.122)* 0.299 (0.122)* 0.628 (0.060)*** 0.628 (0.060)***
Distance
dist geoi?j -0.007 (0.003)** -0.007 (0.003)** -0.002 (0.001)* -0.002 (0.001)*
dist culti?j -0.288 (0.096)** -0.318 (0.099)** -0.072 (0.030)* -0.075 (0.030)*
same legali?j 0.012 (0.005)* 0.013 (0.005)** 0.005 (0.002)** 0.005 (0.002)**
same langi?j 0.013 (0.008) 0.013 (0.008) 0.005 (0.003) 0.005 (0.003)
Trust and relationship
trustj 0.017 (0.000)*** 0.002 (0.002)
tradeT1
i!j
0.154 (0.191) 0.148 (0.185) 0.023 (0.031) 0.022 (0.030)
Institutions
cpitj 0.018 (0.036) 0.011 (0.037) 0.009 (0.016) 0.009 (0.016)
inst: stabtj -0.003 (0.002) -0.004 (0.001)* -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)
Dcpitj -0.019 (0.027) -0.022 (0.027) -0.003 (0.010) -0.003 (0.010)
Controls
gdpt1j 0.157 (0.048)**** 0.160 (0.048)*** 0.058 (0.016)*** 0.058 (0.016)***
gdp capt1j 0.146 (0.054)** 0.139 (0.053)** 0.052 (0.024)* 0.051 (0.024)*
gdp growtht1j 0.042 (0.018)* 0.038 (0.017)* 0.013 (0.010) 0.013 (0.010)
capitalizationt1j 0.039 (0.030) 0.045 (0.030) 0.002 (0.008) 0.003 (0.008)
D gdpt1j1 -0.007 (0.009) -0.008 (0.009) -0.001 (0.003) -0.002 (0.003)
D gdp capt1j1 -0.126 (0.047)** -0.127 (0.047)** -0.045 (0.022)* -0.046 (0.022)*
D gdp growtht1j1 -0.028 (0.014)* -0.029 (0.014) -0.008 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006)
D capitalizationt1J1 0.064 (0.029)* 0.057 (0.029)* 0.014 (0.005)** 0.013 (0.005)**
k (imr) 0.005 (0.003) 0.006 (0.003)* 0.002 (0.001)* 0.002 (0.001)*
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 20,053 20,053 20,053 20,053
R2 (overall) 0.127 0.128 0.423 0.423
R2 (adjusted) 0.127 0.127 0.423 0.422
Dependent variable: VC propensity. This table presents random effects panel data estimates of the impact of venture capital propensity on the
difference between foreign VC-only investment and foreign and local VC syndication by controlling different facets of characteristics. Variables
are as defined in Table 3. Standard errors in parentheses. Subscript i indicates the source country, j the destination country
*, **, *** Significant at the 10, 5, and 1 % levels, respectively
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economies, in emerging economies, it appears to be argu-
ably encourage syndication. Institutional trust (trusttj),
however, has a positive impact in the tendency to form
foreign-domestic syndicates in emerging economies.
Finally, in contrast to deals in developed economies, in
emerging economies geographical distance positively af-
fects the willingness to syndicate. Cultural distance how-
ever negatively affects the willingness to syndicate.
Overall, foreign-domestic syndicates, particularly in
emerging economies, seem to help mitigate the effects of
geographical distance, but not necessarily cultural differ-
ence. However, while foreign VCs are amendable to syn-
dicating with partners from corrupt destination countries,
foreign VCs will still require a minimum level of comfort
or trust in a country’s institutions.
When introducing experience effects (Models 2, 4, and
6), the average investment experience of foreign VCs in the
same sector as the investee firm (exp sectortmaxðkÞ) nega-
tively influences the need to integrate domestic investors,
indicating cross-border investments to be even more
complicated when carried out in an unfamiliar sector. Put
differently, foreign VCs are less likely to seek local syn-
dicated expertise if they feel they have sufficient sector
experience. The experience in the destination country
(exp countrytmaxðkÞ), in turn, has a positive effect, indicating
that domestic partners are found after all in existing net-
works in the destination country. Both, however, are only
true for the sub-sample of developed economies. A possi-
ble explanation is that VCs indeed struggle to identify,
generally avoid, or prematurely terminate relationships
with domestic partners in emerging economies due to
friction, prejudices, or dissatisfaction.
Robustness Tests
To ensure that our results are not solely driven by our
choice of how to construct the dependent variable, we also
ran a set of alternative models. In the reported models, we
not only construct the dependent variable in a way where
every deal adds one count to all participating source
countries, but we also run models where deals either count
once per investor for every destination country, or only for
the destination country with the largest number of inves-
tors. We also replace the number of deals by their value in
US dollars. Zephyr unfortunately has no information on the
amount invested by individual investors, so we have to
assume that all investors participate in the deal with equal
investments.7 Furthermore, we run the same variable setup
in a zero-inflated negative binomial model with the VC
deal count between a country dyad as a dependent vari-
able.8 Overall, these measures lead to quite comparable,
but less pronounced, results and a lower but acceptable
significance and goodness-of-fit of the models. We also
tried alternative measures for our institutional trust vari-
able, such as the indices for the quality of law, the gov-
ernment, investor protection, and accountability provided
by the World Bank. While less pronounced, these results
point in the same direction.
Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the effects of geographical, cul-
tural, and institutional proximity as well as institutional and
relational trust on cross-border VC flows between country
dyads. We contrast cross-border investments made by only
foreign VCs with investments made by both foreign and
local VCs in syndicate. We further analyze cross-border
venture capital investment between developed and
emerging economies, as many emerging economies have
been actively supporting their own venture capital markets
pursuant to the perceived success of VC contribution to
innovation in more developed jurisdictions (Bruton et al.
2004, 2005). These same economies are seeking not only to
attract foreign funds but more specifically foreign expertise
as it is thought that not only would local entrepreneurs
benefit from specialist VC skills, but also that local VCs
would benefit from the transfer of knowledge from the
more sophisticated foreign VCs. However, under-devel-
oped investor and property protection, high cultural dis-
tance, diverging business ethics and practices, and the
perception of corruption in certain jurisdictions are obsta-
cles to the development of these markets. An example of a
jurisdiction that has faced such challenge is China, and it is
this jurisdiction that we have looked to for the motivation
of this research. Despite the institutional obstacles, China
has been able to not only build a venture capital market
from scratch since 1984 (Xiao 2002) but has been able to
develop it to the success it is today, and this has been
attributed to guanxi, or network-based strategies, utilized
by market participants (Peng 2003; Pukthuanthong and
Walker 2007; Su et al. 2007). By taking into account more
jurisdictions, we believe our research provides a more
thorough understanding of the balance between institu-
tional factors and network effects from a pattern of inter-
national alliances and syndicates in the venture capital
industry. In line with prior research, we find evidence that
foreign venture capital flow into developed economies is
7 Alternative measures for bilateral trade, such as unidirectional trade
from SC to DC or DC to SC, sum-of-trade between SC and DC, and
trade-only of goods or services et cetera also remain insignificant.
8 Unfortunately, In Zephyr, the deal value is missing in about 30
percent of the cases, which decreased our number of available
observations.
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facilitated by the building of relational trust among foreign
VCs investing as a syndicate comprising local VCs.
However, we find the driving forces of cross-border VC
investment activities in emerging economies to be sub-
stantially different and widely unexplained by traditional
mechanisms used to analyze venture capital flows in the
context of developed economies. Consistent with Rousseau
et al. (1998), our results suggest institutional trust to be a
necessary precondition for foreign VC inflow as well as the
formation of foreign-domestic syndicates. Institutional
trust thus provides the foundation for building up a critical
mass of initial trust to enter a relationship involving
proximity.
Our findings highlight not only the need for further
analysis of the driving forces of cross-border venture
capital flows, but also more specifically the need for
analysis to explicitly consider investments in emerging
economies. We believe our paper sheds light on a yet
under-explored facet driving cross-border venture capital
investments and thereby provides guidance for academics
on how to integrate more socio-economic determinants in
macroeconomic venture capital investment analyses.
Future research for example could shed even more light by
looking at the effect of changes in the perceptions of trust
or changes in political stability (instability) on venture
capital fund flows. An analysis of the effect of having a VC
partner from the host country on profitability and other
performance metrics could also further extend this
research. For policy makers, we believe our findings may
shed light on the determinants of not only venture capital
inflow but also the inflow of VC expertise. As our findings
suggest, sophisticated VCs are not necessarily transferring
valuable knowledge, such as sector expertise, to local
syndicate members but are more likely to extract such
knowledge. To tap foreign sources of knowledge and
capital, more needs to be done by policy makers in
emerging economies to instill institutional trust which
appears to be a necessary precondition for foreign venture
capital inflow. For example, in China, policies to attract
foreign venture capital emphasize strengthening the legal
environment. Guanxi can only get you so far.
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Wright, Volker Seiler, Douglas Cumming, Wenxuan Hou, Edward
Lee, two anonymous referees, and all participants of the JBE Special
Issue Tibet Conference 2014, the Stanford Scancor Seminar Series
2014, the IKE Research Seminar Series 2013, and the UK IRC
Cambridge Young Scholar Workshop 2012 for invaluable insight,
comments, inspiration, and feedback. All opinions and errors remain
our own.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://crea
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use,
distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Ahlstrom, D., & Bruton, G. D. (2006). Venture capital in emerging
economies: Networks and institutional change. Entrepreneurship
Theory and Practice, 30(2), 299–320.
Arrow, K. J. (1962). Economic welfare and the allocation of resources
for invention. In R. Nelson (Ed.), The rate and direction of
inventive activity (pp. 609–625). Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Avnimelech, G., Kenney, M., & Teubal, M. (2006). Creating venture
capital industries that co-evolve with high tech: Insights from an
extended industry life cycle perspective of the Israeli experience.
Research Policy, 35(10), 1477–1498.
Baygan, G., & Freudenberg, M. (2000). The internationalisation of
venture capital activity in OECD countries: Implications for
measurement and policy. STI Working Paper Series.
Beck, T., Feyen, E., Ize, A., & Moizeszowicz, F. (2008). Bench-
marking financial development. World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 4638.
Bergemann, D., & Hege, U. (1998). Venture capital financing, moral
hazard, and learning. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(6–8),
703–735.
Berger, A., & Frame, W. (2007). Small business credit scoring and
credit availability. Journal of Small Business Management,
45(1), 5–22.
Berger, A., & Udell, G. (1998). The economics of small business
finance: The roles of private equity and debt markets in the
financial growth cycle. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22,
613–673.
Berger, A., & Udell, G. (2002). Small business credit availability and
relationship lending: The importance of bank organisational
structure’. The Economic Journal, 112(477), F32–F53.
Beugelsdijk, S. (2006). A note on the theory and measurement of trust
in explaining differences in economic growth. Cambridge
Journal of Economics, 30(3), 371–387.
Black, B., & Gilson, R. (1998). Venture capital and the structure of
capital markets: Banks versus stock markets. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 47(3), 243–277.
Blau, P. M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York:
Wiley.
Boschma, R. A. (2005). Proximity and innovation: A critical
assessment. Regional Studies, 39(1), 61–74.
Boschma, R., & Frenken, K. (2010). The spatial evolution of
innovation networks. A proximity perspective. In R. A. Boschma
& R. L. Martin (Eds.), Handbook on evolutionary economic
geography (pp. 120–135). Broadheath: Edward Elgar.
Bottazzi, L., Da Rin, M., & Hellmann, T. F. (2011). The importance
of trust for investment: Evidence from venture capital’. NBER
Working Paper 16923.
Bruton, G., & Ahlstrom, D. (2003). An institutional view of china’s
venture capital industry: Explaining the differences between
China and the West. Journal of Business Venturing, 18(2),
233–259.
Bruton, G., Ahlstrom, D., & Yeh, K. S. (2004). Understanding venture
capital in East Asia: The impact of institutions on the industry today
and tomorrow. Journal of World Business, 39(1), 72–88.
Bruton, G. D., Fried, V. H., & Manigart, S. (2005). Institutional
influences on the worldwide expansion of venture capital.
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 29(6), 737–760.
Determinants of Cross-Border Venture Capital Investments in Emerging and Developed Economies… 761
123
Bygrave, W. D., & Timmons, J. A. (1992). Venture capital at the
crossroads. Boston: Harvard Business Press.
CEPII (1990–2011). CEPII database.
Chemmanur, T. J., Hull, T, & Krishnan, K. (2011). Do local and
international venture capitalists play well together? A study of
international venture capital investments’. AFA 2012 Chicago
Meetings Paper.
Coval, J. D., & Moskowitz, T. J. (1999). Home bias at home: Local
equity preference in domestic portfolios. The Journal of
Finance, 54(6), 2045–2073.
Coval, J. D., & Moskowitz, T. J. (2001). The geography of
investment: Informed trading and asset prices. Journal of
Political Economy, 109(4), 811–841.
Cumming, D. J. (2003). The structure, governance and performance
of U.K. Venture capital trusts. Journal of Corporate Law
Studies, 3, 401–427.
Cumming, D. J. (2006a). Adverse selection and capital structure:
Evidence from venture capital. Entrepreneurship Theory and
Practice, 30(2), 155–183.
Cumming, D. J. (2006b). R&D tax offsets, premium offsets and
premium concessions: Australia 1998–2001 versus 2001–2004.
Report Prepared for the Government of Australia.
Cumming, D. J. (2007a). Government policy towards entrepreneurial
finance in Canada: Proposals to move from labour sponsored
venture capital corporations to more effective public policy. CD
Howe Institute Commentary No. 247
Cumming, D. J. (2007b). Government policy towards entrepreneurial
finance: Innovation investment funds. Journal of Business
Venturing, 22, 193–235.
Cumming, D. J. (2011). Review essay: Public policy and the creation
of active venture capital markets. Venture Capital: An Interna-
tional Journal of Entrepreneurship and Finance, 13(1), 75–94.
Cumming, D. J., & Dai, N. (2010). Local bias in venture capital
investments. Journal of Empirical Finance, 17(3), 362–380.
Cumming, D. J., & Johan, S. A. (2006a). Is it the law or the lawyers?
Investment covenants around the world’. European Financial
Management, 12(4), 535–574.
Cumming, D. J., & Johan, S. A. (2006b). Provincial preferences in
private equity. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management,
20, 369–398.
Cumming, D. J., & Johan, S. A. (2007). Advice and monitoring in
venture finance. Financial Markets and Portfolio Management,
21(1), 3–43.
Cumming, D. J., & Johan, S. A. (2013). Venture capital and private
equity contracting: An international perspective (2nd ed.). New
York: Elsevier Science Academic Press.
Dai, N., Jo, H., & Kassicieh, S. (2012). Cross-border venture capital
investments in Asia: Selection and exit performance. Journal of
Business Venturing, 27, 666–684.
Dai, N., & Nahata, R. (2013). Cultural differences and cross-border
venture capital syndication. Working paper.
Davila, A., Foster, G. & Gupta, M. (2003). Venture capital financing
and the growth of start-up firms. Journal of Business Venturing,
18(6), 689–708.
Davis, J. H., & Ruhe, J. A. (2003). Perceptions of country corruption:
Antecedents and outcomes. Journal of Business Ethics, 43(4),
275–288.
Dovey, K. (2009). The role of trust in innovation. The Learning
Organization, 16(4), 311–325.
Duffner, S., Schmid, M. M., & Zimmermann, H. (2009). Trust and
success in venture capital financing—An empirical analysis with
german survey data. KYKLOS, 62(1), 15–43.
Engel, D., & Keilbach, M. (2007). Firm-level implications of early
stage venture capital investment—An empirical investigation.
Journal of Empirical Finance, 14(2), 150–167.
Eurobarometer (1990–2011). Eurostat eurobarometer.
Farmer, R. E., & Winter, R. A. (1986). The role of options in the
resolution of agency problems: A comment. The Journal of
Finance, 41(5), 1157–1170.
Feenstra, R., Lipsey, R., Deng, H., Ma, A., & Mo, H. (2005). ‘World
trade flows: 1962–2000. Technical Report, National Bureau of
Economic Research
Fiet, J. O. (1995a). Reliance upon informants in the venture capital
industry. Journal of Business Venturing, 10(3), 195–223.
Fiet, J. O. (1995b). Risk avoidance strategies in venture capital
markets. Journal of Management Studies, 32(4), 551–574.
Freel, M. (1999). The financing of small firm product innovation
within the UK. Technovation, 19(12), 707–719.
Freel, M. (2000). Barriers to product innovation in small manufac-
turing firms. International Small Business Journal, 18(2), 60–80.
Freel, M. (2007). ‘Are small innovators credit rationed? Small
Business Economics, 28(1), 23–35.
French, K., & Poterba, J. (1991). Investor diversification and interna-
tional equity markets. American Economic Review, 81, 222–226.
Giannetti, M., & Yafeh, Y. (2012). Do cultural differences between
contracting parties matter? Evidence from syndicated bank
loans. Management Science, 58(2), 365–383.
Gompers, P. A., Kovner, A., Lerner, J., & Scharfstein, D. (2008).
Venture capital investment cycles: The impact of public markets.
Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), 1–23.
Gompers, P. A., & Lerner, J. (1999). The venture capital cycle.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Groh, A. P., von Liechtenstein, H., & Canela, M. A. (2007).
International allocation determinants of institutional investments
in venture capital and private equity limited partnerships. IESE
Business School Working Paper No. 726.
Groh, A. P., von Liechtenstein, H., & Lieser, K. (2010). The European
venture capital and private equity country attractiveness indices.
Journal of Corporate Finance, 16(2), 205–224.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2008). Trusting the stock
market. The Journal of Finance, 63(6), 2557–2600.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2009). Cultural biases in
economic exchange? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(3),
1095–1131.
Guler, I., & Guillén, M. F. (2005). Knowledge, institutions, and
foreign entry: the internationalization of US venture capital
firms. Working Paper.
Guler, I., & Guillén, M. F. (2010). Institutions and the internation-
alization of US venture capital firms. Journal of International
Business Studies, 41(2), 185–205.
Hall, B. H. (2010). The financing of innovative firms. Review of
Economics and Institutions, 1(1), 1–30.
Hall, B. H., & Lerner, J. (2009). The financing of R&D and
innovation. NBER Working Paper 15325.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 47, 153–161.
Hofstede, G., & Bond, M. H. (1984). Hofstede’s culture dimensions.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 15(4), 417.
Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). Cultures
and organizations: Software of the mind. London: McGraw-
Hill.
Hsu, D. H. (2004). What do entrepreneurs pay for venture capital
affiliation? The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1805–1844.
Huntington, S., & Fukuyama, F. (2006). Political order in changing
societies. London: Yale University Press.
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Mäkelä, M. M. & Maula, M. V. (2008). Attracting cross border venture
capital: The role of a local investor.Entrepreneurship and Regional
Development, 20(3), 237–257.
Manigart, S., Lockett, A., Meuleman, M., Wright, M., Landstrøm, H.,
Bruining, H., Desbrieres, P., & Hommel, U. (2002). Why do
european venture capital companies syndicate. Ghent University
and Ghent Management School Working Paper.
Manigart, S., Lockett, A., Meuleman, M., Wright, M., Landstrøm, H.,
Bruining, H., et al. (2006). Venture capitalists’ decision to
syndicate. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(2),
131–153.
Mayer, T., & Zignago, S. (2011). Notes on CEPII’s distances
measures: The geodist database. Working Papers 2011-25,
CEPII.
McAllister, D. J. (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as founda-
tions for interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of
Management Journal, 38(1), 24–59.
Megginson, W. L. (2004). Toward a global model of venture capital?
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 16(1), 89–107.
Melitz, J., & Toubal, F. (2012) Native language, spoken language,
translation and trade. Working Papers 2012-17, CEPII.
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1996). Strategic
alliances and interfirm knowledge transfer. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 17, 77–91.
Nahata, R. (2008). Venture capital reputation and investment perfor-
mance. Journal of Financial Economics, 90(2), 127–151.
Nahata, R., Hazarika, S., & Tandon, K. (2013). Success in global
venture capital investing: Do institutional and cultural differ-
ences matter? Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
Forthcoming.
Nielsen, R. P. (2003). Corruption networks and implications for
ethical corruption reform. Journal of Business Ethics, 42(2),
125–149.
Nooteboom, B. (2000). Learning by interaction: Absorptive capacity,
cognitive distance and governance. Journal of Management and
Governance, 4(1–2), 69–92.
Nooteboom, B. (2006). Trust and innovation. Essay written for the
Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic
performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Parwada, J. T. (2008). The genesis of home bias? The location and
portfolio choices of investment company start-ups. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(1), 245–266.
Peng, M. W. (2000). Business strategies in transition economies.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
Peng, M. W. (2001). How entrepreneurs create wealth in transition
economies. The Academy of Management Executive, 15(1),
95–108.
Peng, M. W. (2003). Institutional transitions and strategic choices.
The Academy of Management Review, 28(2), 275–296.
Polanyi, M. (1966). Personal knowledge: Towards a post-critical
philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
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Schertler, A., & Tykvová, T. (2009) Venture capital and internation-
alization. ZEW Discussion Papers.
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